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Abstract—To ensure the safety of ships and ports, groups and
individuals, at all levels of the maritime sector, use analysis
to identify potential hazards and their outcomes. One of the
most relied upon methods is using a risk assessment tool to
define and prioritise threats. A disadvantage of most existing
assessment frameworks, however, is their inability to update
risks dynamically as factors, such as the environment, change.
In the maritime sector, a range of dynamic factors is needed to
measure risks, but most conventional frameworks are unable to
use them to revise and update their risk profiles. In addition to
static and dynamic, maritime operational risks can be affected by
elements classified as cyber, cyber-physical, or physical in nature.
This demonstrates the relatively equal presence of information
and operational technology (i.e. IT/OT) used, however most
quantitative risk assessment frameworks are normally limited
to one or the other. This article explores the full range of cyber-
related risk factor types within maritime in order to evaluate
applicable risk frameworks and suggest improvements that could
help each of those tools assess maritime-cyber risks specifically.
Index Terms—cyber, dynamic, risk, maritime, cyber-physical
I. INTRODUCTION
Maritime industries are responsible for transporting 90% of
the world’s goods [1], requiring widespread infrastructure and
fleets of specially designed ships. Moreover this sector, worth
trillions, has an unmatched reach across international waters
and an increasing presence within the cyber domain. This ex-
poses people and goods to a complex, diverse, range of factors
that affect their risks; the top 2018 risk considered in maritime
and shipping being business interruptions [2]. However, in a
new development, cyber incidences (i.e., accidents, intentional
attacks) are both a fast-rising and considerable threat to the
maritime community, ranking as the 2nd highest risk in 2018
[3]. This is a significant jump from five years ago, when
it ranked 15th. Since then, the vulnerabilities of a modern
systems-of-systems ship layout and the high demands on
international shipping has increased the risk of cyber-related
accidents, but also the risk of an intentional exploit or attack.
The recent Costco and Maersk incidences have drawn even
more attention to the importance of cyber-risk management in
the maritime industry, but with little understanding how that
should be establish, particularly on ships at sea [4], [5].
In an attempt to prevent untoward situations, other industries
have, in the past, adopted methods of risk assessment and
prevention. It has been estimated that the maritime sector is
roughly twenty years behind these industries [6], partially due
to the slow progression of technological advancement. How-
ever, as seen with technology today and in the near future (e.g.,
autonomous, remote control, augmented reality), maritime has
quickly reached the point where it needs to, more seriously,
consider risk assessment procedures. In general, quantitative
risk assessments are popular for evaluating and managing risk
[7]–[10] and have been used to analyse specific physical, no
cyber considered, ship risks [11]. Some of these assessment
tools are also model-based (e.g., Coras [9]). The steps for
risk assessment can be generalised in to three key steps,
threat identification, assessment or modelling, and risk profile
output. However, conventional risk assessments normally do
these steps sequentially and in isolation to identify significant
risks and maintain safety. This has the disadvantage of being
entirely static, as it fails to adapt to changes in the factors and
variations of risks as events take place. This has contributed to
accidents in the past, such as the BP Texas refinery accident
which killed 15 people and injured another 170 [12].
Although existing maritime risk assessment frameworks
can evaluate physical risks, this sector needs to develop
cyber-related risk management since existing solutions tend
to be static and disregards dynamic factors. Therefore, the
purpose of this article is to (1) examine how the maritime
risk landscape can be modelled in terms of cyber, physical,
static, and dynamic factors, (2) determine which are relevant
for measuring maritime risk, and (3) determine if they are
accounted for in existing frameworks. Specifically we evaluate
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST [13],
[14]), Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA [15]), and
Marine Cyber-Risk Assessment (MaCRA [16]). Section II
covers background material for maritime and risk assessment.
Section III analyses risk factors ranging through cyber, physi-
cal, dynamic, and static. Section IV looks at how current risk
assessments cope with these risk factors, backed with survey
data acquired for this paper, and concludes with Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern maritime security, including cyber-security, is a rel-
atively new accepted concept [17]–[19], wrought from evolv-
ing Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology
(OT) systems. Shore-side port infrastructure has probably had
its largest advancement in IT. At sea and on ships, however, IT
and OT have advanced more equally. While individuals in this
sector are familiar with physical risk assessment, they are less
so with cyber. Hence this section is dedicated to understanding
the current state of maritime technology and risk assessment
methodology, which will then be broken down in Section III
to determine what factors an ideal maritime cyber-related risk
assessment method should measure to be fully effective.
Fig. 1. General IT, OT, and human elements to be found on a generic ship.
A. Maritime Technology
The maritime sector is, and has been, a critical component
in global trade and transportation. In its past, physical attacks
like piracy were a common threat, and thus assessing those
risks are well established. More specifically, risk factors like
geographic location, cargo value, and attacker resources helped
mariners and shipowners quantify the risks of certain voyages
etc. The introduction of electronic systems, the first sonar
being used on ships in the early 1900’s, was then quickly
followed by integration of cyber-systems both off-shore and
in a ship’s work environment. Each new system was introduced
to decrease workloads and improve safety. Unfortunately, this
resulted in the relatively quick development of a complex
computing environment. Moreover, as they were primarily
designed to improve efficiency and safety, these information
and operational systems presented many cyber-security vul-
nerabilities. That said, it is impossible to discount the human
element, which can add or mitigate risks [20], [21].
The introduction of larger, more technologically advanced
ships, such as the modern oil tanker developed in the 1870’s,
the introduction of containerisation in the 1970’s, and the
continual evolution of passenger ships, has drastically changed
the maritime risk landscape by introducing cyber and cyber-
physical risks. This article defines cyber-physical primarily as
attacks with both cyber and physical elements [22]. Much
of the these attributes are the result of both information
technology (e.g., navigation systems) and operational technol-
ogy (e.g., propulsion systems). Because of all the physical
operations required in shipping, the amount of physical and
cyber factors are fairly even, particularly when compared to
conventional computing systems. This mirrors other trans-
portation sectors, however the magnitude of cargo volume
and distance/time travelled within maritime is significantly
more. Lastly, the most recent introduction of internet, com-
plex networking (e.g., the Internet-of-things), and wireless
communications has compounded the existing cyber-related
risks in maritime. To help demonstrate this, Figure 1 shows
the location of several IT, OT, and human elements on a
generalised ship. The categories of the IT and OT systems are
relatively generic and may encompass several systems (e.g.,
navigational ECDIS, AIS) but provides background info.
B. Risk Assessment Methodology
Within risk assessment methodology there are two core
methods, qualitative and quantitative. While qualitative as-
sessment focuses on prioritising individual risks based on
probability of occurrences, the latter focuses on numerically
analysing risk by assigning numerical risk values. Today, the
majority of maritime physical risk assessments are based on
probability statistics. These methods are quite reliable, sup-
ported by an extensive amount of historical statistics needed
for risk assessment [23]–[25]. As discussed further in Section
III, this makes it very difficult to develop a qualitative risk
assessment framework for cyber-risks in maritime. Not only
is there very little data, because of limit reporting abilities
and as it a new, growing risk, but the evolution of maritime-
cyber makes the data volatile enough that it is very difficult to
develop reliable probabilities. This, in turn, makes it difficult
to build a qualitative maritime cyber-risk assessment.
For the rest of this paper, the focus will be on quantitative
risk assessments for the reasons above [7]–[9], [11], [16].
The majority of qualitative assessment methods make use
of mathematical or computing models, which simplify the
problem by only considering the factors that are relevant to the
risk. Because of this, the benefits and negatives of this method
depend on what elements are being modelled; their relevance,
the quantity or set size, and the overall coverage of the set.
Benefits of qualitative risk analysis is often more objectivity
when derived from solid facts. Negatives of this approach have
been experienced in the early days of the financial market,
early 2000’s, where a poor set range, or diversity, meant the
model was unable to consider unusual tail events.
Many quantitative risk analysis models reduce these issues
by reducing the problem, choosing a very specific scenario to
analyse. This has been seen in [7] and [11], which can limit the
problem to a specific target, geographic location, or outcome
(e.g., ship collision). A model that encompass more elements
can be used to assess more risks, however, the performance
overhead from more computations can be hindering. Moreover,
when complex models are mostly executed by human experts,
there is a likelihood that errors will be introduced. Complex
models can be difficult to understand as well, although it
has been found that graphically displayed complex risks, as
CORAS does, can improve understanding [26], [27].
III. MARITIME RISK FACTORS
This article has briefly discussed IT (e.g., information shar-
ing), OT (e.g., physical operations), and the human element in
an maritime environment. These three have been considered
the top categories of risk factors, however, each element
belonging to these categories can be further categorised into
static or dynamic, and physical or cyber factors that should be
modelled to assess risk. This is particularly important in the
maritime environment today, with the rise of cyber-physical
systems [28]. This detail of element categorising is unusual
in related works, and will allow this research to assess how
effective existing risk assessments can be for maritime.
TABLE I
CATEGORIES OF KEY FACTORS TO CONSIDER WHEN ASSESSING MARITIME CYBER RISK ON SHIPS.
Risk Factor Static Dynamic Cyber Physical
H CrewL training, history* health, resources ID/password, internet use location, health, devices (BYOD)
H OperatorsR training, history* health, resources communication health
H PassengersL history* health, resources internet use, communication location, health, devices (BYOD)
H ¬OperatorsR history resources, incentives internet use, communication location
IT Navigation protocols, hardware software, use software, network use hardware (e.g., ECDIS, AIS, NAVTEX)
IT Communication protocols, hardware software, use ID, software, access hardware (e.g., GMDSS, LRIT, SSAS)
IT Sensors hardware, network devices*, use, software network, access hardware, locations
IT Monitoring hardware, network software, use access control, network hardware, access
OT Propulsion hardware, mechanisms use, environment terminals, communication mechanisms (propeller), access
OT Cargo contents*, history* environment (temp) tags, internal sensors location, health
OT Moor/Anchor mechanisms, crew* protocols, environment protocols, communication mechanisms, location, crew
OT Engineering crew*, mechanisms environment (temp) terminals, communication mechanisms (engines), environment, crew
H - Human, IT - information technology, OT - operational technology, * - static if single voyage, dynamic if assessing longer period of time
A. Static Factors
Each of the following subsections for static, dynamic, phys-
ical, and cyber factors (i.e. Section III.A-III.D) will discuss
how they affect risks within the human (H), IT and OT risk
categories established earlier on. For the interested reader,
more details on human threats (e.g., criminal, hactivists) can
be found in [18], [29]. A mapping of risk factors can also be
found in Table I to help demonstrate their connections to risk.
For the purpose of this paper there are four types of
human categories, local on-ship crew (crewL), remote oper-
ators (operatorsR), on-ship passengers (passengersL), and
remote non-operator people (¬operatorsR). As local crew and
passengers, if they exist, are unlikely to leave a ship mid-
voyage, their history prior boarding are static factors. For a
crewman this includes their training based on set standards.
Although training standards change with the times [20], and
there are slight variations across different groups, the training
for a crew member is static at the point they are on a ship, as
they are unlikely to receive extra training during a voyage. On
the other hand, while the history of the individual people are
static per voyage, it is likely to change as people disembark
and embark at ports. These factors are important, as they
establish previous criminal records or vulnerabilities (e.g.,
health, finance). Assessing human risk with both static and
dynamic risk factors has been done previously [30], [31],
although it has primarily been used on sex offenders, where
static factors include history and dynamic factors include
substance abuse. A significant shift in maritime that shall occur
in the future is remote control and autonomy [16], which may
shift crew risk factors towards remote operators.
Much like how the amount and types of people on-board
differ between ship types (e.g., cruise, tanker), on-board IT
systems also vary. However, because of standards set, and
altered, by the IMO International Convention for Safety of
Life at Sea [19], ships of similar types are mandated to have
standard IT systems. These have been loosely categorised into
navigation, communication (e.g., human to human, machine
to machine), sensors, and monitoring. The last two were
previously combined in Figure 1 as they possessed similar
capture and network technology, however, their risk factors
diverge more when considered in depth (Table I). Because of
existing standards, the static factors of ship IT systems are
primarily their hardware, established networks, and protocols
to use those networks. Changes to these factors happen much
less often than crew change, and even if hardware or physical
network nodes are upgraded or otherwise changed, the ship is
unlikely to undergo these alterations during normal operations.
Instead, retrofitting normally stalls normal operations. There-
fore the main risks to consider with these elements, is static
vulnerabilities in the supply chain and maintenance. These
static factors increase inherent risks. This could be structural
issues, where IT system hardware is vulnerable physically, or
in a cyber-sense, if a back door was built in for intruder access.
For OT this paper makes a distinction between hardware
and mechanisms, although a mechanism could be considered
a subset. Here, the term hardware is used in the computing
sense while mechanisms, like a propeller or winch, have
physical operations. Table I also differentiates propulsion from
engineering unlike Figure 1. While the figure considered them
nearly identical in terms of function and physical location on-
board, risk factors in engineering have a much more diverse
outcome and has more crew interaction. This differentiation
may be even more pronounced in the future, as ship engineer-
ing OT is becoming more sophisticated and interactive with IT
[32]. Risks from these static features tend to result in accidents,
as the vulnerability is constant, while dynamic factors can be
changed to trigger an attack. A flaw in computer hardware
or OT mechanisms could lead to a damaging event, while a
shortcoming in crew training could result in the mishandling of
systems. For example, there was a rise in engineering-related
accidents after a global shift to a new type of fuel [2].
B. Dynamic Factors
Being able to measure factors as they change is critical
when analysing risk over a significant amount of time, or if
elements are likely to change at a quick pace. Both are relevant
to shipping, as voyages can take months, the life cycle of ship
is an average of 20 years [33] (at least 5 years more than
the average aircraft), and the speed at which cyber elements
change can be relatively quick. Therefore, to fully analyse
relevant shipping risks across a number of ships, environments,
and scenarios, dynamic factors must be considered.
When assessing the dynamic risk factors of people, for
those involved with shipping operations, remote and local,
it is important to consider changes in “health”, i.e. mental,
physical, and financial. Threats to these could make an individ-
ual vulnerable to blackmail or manipulation from a malicious
party, or become a malicious entity. Examples of sextortion
and blackmail have been seen on ships, as well as disgruntled
employees becoming insider threats and passengers acciden-
tally leaking information [18], [29], [34]–[36]. These factors
can change at any time, triggered by an event such as a fishing
email. This is a common event on-shore (e.g. at a port), but
also happens on a ship. Over a 5-day period, GTMaritime mail
gateways scan a million messages, 31,836 of which are spam
and 2,196 contain actual malware or viruses [37]. Of the last
type of human considered, both non-crew and non-passenger,
the only people of interest are malicious third parties. In
the cyber-realm that means different types of hackers [16],
along with physical attackers like criminals, or pirates, and
those interested in warfare. Therefore, the only people who
can affect maritime risk in the ¬operatorsR category are
attackers, therefore the dynamic elements worth measuring are
their resources and goals, which can easily change.
The primary dynamic factors for risk within maritime IT
systems is their software and use. The majority of IT ship sys-
tems, particularly on the bridge (e.g., ECDIS, AIS, GMDSS,
SSAS), are single purpose. The primary example is ECDIS
(Electronic Chart Display and Information System), which
has an underlying OS [38]. This OS, normally Windows but
occasionally Linux, has the capacity to do many things but is
used purely for executing ECDIS to navigate. This limitation
on use can reduce the risks. However, there are enough
use-cases (e.g., updating charts) and misuse cases that can
affect risk dynamically. Unlike navigation, communication and
monitoring (e.g., CCTV) systems, ship sensors have a plethora
of applications. Moreover, the design of sensor networks and
the cost/simplicity of individual sensors today means that
sensor networks are versatile, dynamic, and spread widely.
This is becoming more relevant with Internet-of-Things (IoT)
in maritime, particularity in smart container tags for shipping.
How sensor readings are made and stored, and how they affect
decisions (i.e., man-made and machine-made), affect the risk
of the ship. This includes cargo, which can be temperature
sensitive or motion sensitive, people (e.g., carbon-dioxide
levels), and the ship’s physical and cyber safety.
The dynamic factors of OT are similar to IT in that they
are also dependent on how they are used by other systems and
people. Unlike IT, however, the amount of OT being operated
by humans is much lower, as it is limited to a subset of the
local crew. Very few OT systems allow remote control at this
point in time, whereas ship IT systems are more connected to
the Internet. This may change especially if more ships trend
towards autonomy. As OT systems interact with the physical
world, dynamic risks also include ship surroundings, such
as sand banks and port structures. As the ship moves and
environments change, these factors for measuring risks are
uniquely dynamic in transportation sectors, such as maritime.
C. Cyber Factors
Measuring cyber risk has been done many times across
various sectors and their systems. However, very little has
been done in the maritime sector which has been estimated to
be 20 years behind cyber-security trends [6] based on cyber-
crime law and the rate of technological integration. Moreover
the unique systems, protocols, and the movement across
physical and cyber spaces mean that traditional methods of
risk assessment cannot be easily applied without modification.
However, the basic concept of communications human-to-
human, machine-to-human, and machine-to-machine still af-
fect risk. For human-cyber interactions, the factors to measure
for risk are human identifications and security (e.g., ID cards,
passwords), who they communicate with, and how. For remote
operators and hackers this is the primary risk element to
analyse. This is also a significant factor for local crew and
passengers with easier, local, access. This same connection
can be used to exploit people and propagate viruses [34], [37].
Within information technology, specialised navigation sys-
tems like ECDIS, as mentioned earlier, have a set of protocols
for interactions with local networks and the wider Internet.
This limits the risks to the use of those protocols, and the se-
curity of the network. Specialised communication technology
like marine radio also have fixed use protocols, which can
limit the possible risks. For more versatile networks, those
hosting sensors, cameras and internet-based communications,
they must consider user identification and passwords and
user permissions. Particularly for CCTV and other sensitive
monitors or sensors, access control is an important part of
assessing risks. For a ship’s cyber security it must also consider
the physical patterns of crew and any existing passengers
on-board, even more than the change of personnel in all
other work environments. Not only is the timing and number
of such changes significant, but on international voyages
the nationalities and employers of people on-board can vary
significantly. This is a fairly unique and potentially significant
contributing factor to risk, with a significant dynamic aspect.
Of the three categories, operational technology on ships and
at ports are the least Internet connected. However, this does not
mean that they don’t have some kind of networking technology
involved (e.g., SCADA) or that this may not change in the
future [32]. To access OT networks on ships it must be
done at specific terminals, currently primarily in engineering
instead of the bridge, a centre for IT systems. These networks
have known vulnerabilities, however, because of the current
access requirements, it is really only local crew that can affect
these risks. SCADA and similar networks types enable cyber
communications, although not with the same bandwidth and
reach as the Internet, which can contribute to maritime-cyber
risks. This can be seen in similar, yet different, studies of
SCADA security in other sectors like water, power, and rail
[39]–[42]. Because operational technology have both physical
and cyber elements, their presence, scale in size, and uses
mean that maritime security is equally, and uniquely, cyber
and physically orientated when considering risk.
Fig. 2. Risk factor compass to show strongest influenced characteristics.
D. Physical Factors
The last category of factors that affect maritime risk, as
discussed here, is physical. For people, risk for operators,
local and remote, and passengers is measured by their physical
health and the devices they bring on board. This is becoming
more important today with bring your own devices (BYOD)
and the increase use of smart phones and USB enabled devices
(e.g., e-cigarettes, cameras) that can spread malware. For
physical outcomes, other risks can be tied to lithium batteries
and other device components that can cause a physical hazard.
For all human risk elements, location is another risk factor.
For some this is static, as most cyber-attackers and remote
operators do not change their physical location. However for
people on a ship, their location is dynamic which may alter
the risks involved. For example, close proximity to fishing,
terrorist, or high-traffic hot spots affect different risks. Lastly,
the human element affects IT/OT physical security as local
crew, and sometimes passengers, can touch those systems.
For both IT and OT, there are physical components that can
both affect risk and be affected by risks. The computational
hardware of the systems need physical access security as
well as cyber-access security. In addition, those that may be
exposed to harsh environmental factors, like sensors, have
different risks. This can include sensing equipment inside
the ship, monitoring volatile cargo or the inner workings of
the engines, or externally measuring the wind, water, etc.
Outcomes of these vulnerabilities and risks will be discussed
further in the next subsection. The main difference between
IT and OT when considering physical risks is that, again, OT
relies less on computing hardware and includes mechanisms
like motors, robotic arms, and winches to perform tasks like
propulsion and cargo handling. Furthermore, there is currently
less automation with OT devices, requiring more physical
interactions and command sequences from crew. Because OT
interacts heavily with the environment (e.g., mooring to a pier,
unloading cargo to a truck), physical elements that affect risk
must be considered in order to fully assess maritime risks.
TABLE II
HIGH OVERVIEW OF RISK OUTCOMES GIVEN A FACTOR.
Risk Factor Finance Loss Loss of Life Env. Damage
CrewL 2 + [1-3] 2 + [1-3] 1 + [1-3]
OperatorsR 3 + [1-4] 1 + [1-2] 1 + [1-2]
PassengersL 2 + [2-4] 2 + [1-3] 1 + [1-3]
¬OperatorsR 3 + [2-5] 2 + [1-3] 1 + [1-2]
Navigation 2 + [1-3] 3 + [1-4] 2 + [1-4]
Comms. 2 + [1-2] 2 + [1-3] 1 + [1-2]
Sensors 2 + [1-2] 2 + [1-3] 2 + [1-3]
Monitoring 1 + [1-3] 2 + [1-2] 1 + [1-1]
Propulsion 2 + [1-3] 3 + [1-4] 3 + [1-3]
Cargo 4 + [1-5] 3 + [1-5] 2 + [1-3]
Moor/Anchor 2 + [1-2] 2 + [1-2] 3 + [1-3]
Engineering 2 + [1-3] 2 + [1-3] 2 + [1-2]
Risk(F,L,E) = StaticRisk +DynamicRisk[low − high] (1)
Risk 1-None 2-Few 3-Some 4-Often 5-Severe
Static No Risk Inherent Inherent Inherent pervasive
Dynamic No Risk Fluctuates Fluctuates Fluctuates pervasive
E. Risk Outcomes
The compass in Figure 2 demonstrates how factors of risk
range across the physical, cyber, static, dynamic spectrum.
Moreover, each category of human, IT, and OT are biased
to certain quadrants of the compass due to their inherent
natures. For example OT trends toward more physical, and
remote humans tend to affect dynamic cyber risks more than
local crew or passengers. This demonstrates how the unique
blend of these factors create a distinct maritime risk landscape.
However, before continuing to current risk assessment frame-
works for maritime, and whether they aptly cover the range of
factors for measuring risk, this section discusses the potential
outcomes of these risks. Part of determining which risks
require solutions is understanding the types of outcomes and
their potential severity. The types of risk outcomes considered
in this paper, which can be applied to human, IT, and OT
entities, are denial-of-service (DoS), misdirect, damage, theft,
and obfuscate. Ultimately, these risks can result in outcomes
such as loss of finance, loss of life, and environmental damage.
Table II breaks down the potential severity of risk outcomes
when considering the human, IT, and OT factors within mar-
itime. Outcomes are shown ultimately as loss of life, finance,
and damage to the surrounding environment. Each of these
can be achieved with the types of attacks mentioned earlier
(e.g., DoS). However, for now, only the ultimate outcome is
considered. To estimate the severity of risk in each of these
categories, when considering a certain factor, the level of risk
is calculated from adding the static risk with the dynamic risk,
see eq (1), both of which consider physical and cyber.
As previously mentioned, static risks are inherent in the
design of a system or person (e.g., past behaviours) and they
are unchanging. Therefore the risk associated is either non
existent, or a constant risk. In Table II, this is shown with
values 1 to 5, with the most severe level saying this risk can
be found readily and with severe outcomes. Because dynamic
risks can be a range of values depending on context, the
dynamic risk value is shown as a range of potential values.
IV. MARITIME RISK ASSESSMENT
Knowing how maritime factors affect risk, it is now possible
to evaluate how well risk assessment tools can be applied to
the unique maritime sector. The first requirement of a useful
assessment framework is the ability to account for all factors
of risk, which, as discussed in Section III, includes cyber,
physical, static and dynamic. Secondly, the frameworks will
be assessed on their prioritisation abilities, to determine the
top risks and concerns so they can be dealt with immediately.
Lastly, the risk assessment frameworks will be evaluated
on their user-friendly aspect, namely if they are helpful in
human-based decision making. Understanding how current
risk frameworks achieve these three assessment goals will
determine how they will need to change to adapt to maritime.
In detail, we will gain an understanding of how these will need
to change for future applications in ships and ports that are
autonomous, remote-control, or use augmented reality.
A. Risk Framework Comparison
The risk frameworks that will be evaluated and compared
are NIST, FMEA, and MaCRA (introduced in Section I).
There are many NIST frameworks for assessing various risks,
however, this article will focus on the management of IT
systems [13] and Industrial Control Systems security (ICS)
[14]. The latter is very similar to what is considered OT
systems, however this is very specialised to manufacturing
and distributions around the site, not national or international
transportation. The NIST IT risk framework assumes that the
physical and network security, once established, is set or static,
but that would not be true if the systems were on-board moving
ships. Another concern is that the two NIST frameworks
are dissimilar and would need to be combined somehow to
cover both physical and cyber risks. Moreover, the ICS risk
framework is not versatile enough to assess maritime risks,
while the IT framework is more applicable for just IT.
The most concerning limitation to NIST frameworks, how-
ever, is the lack dynamic risk measurements. This has been
a factor in OT incidences, or more specifically ICS, and has
previously resulted in loss of life [12]. Similarly, FMEA does
not consider dynamic features, however, this is more clearly
by design, as its purpose is to identify all possible failures in a
design, process, product, or service in its early stages of design
or re-design [15]. This makes FMEA a useful assessment tool
for inherent flaws, or what this paper has labelled as static risk.
This makes FMEA and NIST useful in static risk assessment,
physical or cyber, but less so with dynamic risks. However,
both these frameworks use gradients of risk in order to rank the
risks they do analyse and prioritise risk management strategies.
While highly effective in most environments, because of the
wide range of risks in maritime cyber (see Figure2), they are
likely to be less effective. With ranked risks one can prioritise
fixing major flaws. If done thoroughly, FMEA could mitigate
the dynamic risks once a ship is released, however, mitigate
every risk no matter how minor is not cost effective, and during
the lifetime of a ship (average 20 years) significant unseen
risks can arise as global circumstances change.
TABLE III
RISK ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK COMPARISON FOR MARITIME.
NIST FMEA MACRA
Cyber Risks DD D DDD
Physical Risks DD DDD DD
Static Risks DDD DDD D
Dynamic Risks D DDD
Well established DDD DDD D
Appropriate audience D D DDD
D= some, DD= yes, DDD= yes and integrated into framework
Unfortunately, the human element plays a minor roll in
the NIST and FMEA frameworks discussed so far. Again,
NIST has a separate framework for this (i.e., SP 800-53
Personnel Security) and it is not clear whether, if combined,
they could cover the range of risks discussed for maritime.
FMEA has branched into human error (e.g., health-care [43]),
but it is also considered a separate use and not integrated with
IT/OT assessments. While future ships may shrink crew sizes,
it is highly unlikely that crew will be completely removed
from the sector. It has been estimated that autonomous ships,
with all life support systems removed, can reduce operational
costs significantly [44], however, if a passenger ship already
requires human safe conditions it is not worth the considerable
risk of running those ships without a crew. Frameworks like
NIST also suggest using a significant number of accessible
specialists to combat such risks. The problem with this is, as
seen in Figure 2, the scope of possible risk even on-board
can be daunting. It would be unreasonable to expect sufficient
levels of expertise on-board or remotely available, which is
another issue to consider for maritime risk. Lastly, the targeted
audience in the NIST documents are predominately high-level
management and security experts, which is less relevant to the
range of audience types actively interested in maritime security
(see survey results in Section IV.B) and FMEA results can vary
hugely depending on the investigation team.
The last framework evaluated is MaCRA [29], which is less
tested but more maritime orientated (see Table III). This frame-
work is relatively new and not well established, however it
was destined specifically for maritime. Moreover, much focus
has been placed on measuring dynamic risks as technology
evolve, i.e. reactive, as seen in this assessment of autonomous
ships [16]. Another drawback of this framework’s early stages
of development is the lack of widespread data required to
calculate the risks. While an effort has been made to assess
features in the maritime context, MaCRA does not assess
static risks as thoroughly as dynamic, as those are established
outside of shipping operations. However, a simple solution
would be to feed FMEA data on static risks to MaCRA. As
FMEA would not be applied to maritime context, but instead
be used to assess the manufacturing plants and processes, it
would not need to be heavily altered to successfully enhance
MaCRA maritime risk assessments. This seems may be a
more viable solution than merging parts of several NIST
frameworks, create a new one for the missing dynamic aspect,
and then ensure that they are applicable to marine.
Fig. 3. Significant concerns facing the maritime industry.
Fig. 4. Factors that have an effect on maritime cyber risks.
Fig. 5. Actions to reduce cyber risks in maritime.
B. Survey Results
To further assess the usability of certain frameworks, con-
cerning maritime security, we conducted a survey for this
paper. This survey consisted of 22 questions regarding mar-
itime security factors, training, and use. Of the 55 participants,
45.5% of them were mariners and port officers, roughly
19% were trainers/trainees, 10% was higher management,
and 6% were high ranking security specialists (e.g., chief
information officer, information system security officer). The
remaining participants included maritime services, equipment
providers, regulators, insurers, IT system owners or support,
and academics. It is important to note that only roughly 15%
of these participants identified themselves as being a part
of the targeted audience of the NIST frameworks examined
[13], [14]. Moreover, FMEA primarily targets manufactures
only, meaning it is applicable to roughly 5% of those who
were interested enough in maritime cyber-security to take this
survey. While 41% of participants were not familiar with risk
assessment in general, however, 22% knew of NIST.
Of these participants, over 80% ranked crew training stan-
dards as the top problem, with cyber crime and attacks ranking
at second with 56% (see Figure 3). Moreover, 57% of partic-
ipants said that they have not received any training in cyber-
security, and 80% of participants believe that specific maritime
cyber training would be more useful to their daily tasks
than generic cyber-security training. With regards to cyber
incidences, participants thought IT was the most vulnerable
technology at 51%, however 38% believed IT and OT were
equally, and significantly, at risk. This demonstrates how both
IT and OT need to be considered when assessing risk, which
are more easily assessed with the existing FMEA and MaCRA
frameworks. As described previously, NIST assesses IT very
well, but is less capable of assessing IT/OT and humans
blended together and, therefore, less applicable to maritime.
According to participants, their top three cyber crime con-
cerns are malware (26%), phishing scams (16%) and web-
based attacks (16%). Other surveys have had similar results
with this query [45], [46]. However, these surveys rarely ask
about what factors play into these risks. Even though these
concerns seem primarily IT-based, and therefore can be solved
with IT cyber-security solutions, in the maritime sector a wide
range of physical, dynamic factors must be considered as seen
in Figure 4. While ship computers and internet activity are
ranked as critical cyber-factors by 79% of participants, over
50% of participants also identified ship location, route, cargo,
crew, and insider threats as factors in risk. As shown in Sector
III, these elements represent both dynamic and static factors.
This survey supports the idea that maritime cyber security
is a mix of cyber, physical, static and dynamic elements.
Moreover, participants confirmed that this range of elements
should be considered while assessing the security of ships
and ports. To better assess these assets in the future, it is
therefore important to modify existing frameworks to work in
the maritime ethos or to continue develop maritime-specific
framework until they are equally well known and usable.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The maritime sector is not only a significant aspect of
modern life and supports a multi-billion industry, nations
depend on its services. Although relatively behind in terms
of technology, it is becoming more imperative to consider
maritime cyber-security to ensure safe and reliable operations.
However, maritime is not new to risks, as physical risks are
well understood. Moving forward, it is important to combine
current physical risk assessment with cyber-knowledge, as well
as consider static and dynamic risks. This paper demonstrated
the importance of this by highlighting the types of factors
(i.e., human, information technology, operational technology)
that affect maritime risk and evaluating existing frameworks.
It further evaluated these frameworks and examined maritime
risks using results of a survey conducted for this article and
from a wide range of participants. This helped us further
conclude that there is no well-established risk assessment
framework adequately suited for maritime, and suggest com-
binations or enhancements to current frameworks (i.e., NIST,
FMEA, MaCRA) in order to improve maritime safety.
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